Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio

The City of East Cleveland had a municipal ordinance on the books that regulated who could live together as a family in a single-family dwelling unit. Inez Moore, an elderly grandmother, was convicted of violating the ordinance and sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. Her violation was her insistence in being able to live in the same house with one of her grandsons. Mrs. Moore appealed her case to the U.S. Supreme Court after Ohio courts rejected her appeals, because she believed the ordinance violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Mrs. Moore that the city could not prohibit her grandson from living with her. This was a 5-to-4 decision with a plurality opinion expressing the views of four justices, and one justice concurring in the judgment, but doing so on separate grounds.

Zablocki v. Redhail

Roger Redhail, a Wisconsin resident, admitted in a paternity action to fathering a baby girl born out of wedlock. He was ordered to pay child support in accordance with Wisconsin law but was unable to keep current in his payments owing to unemployment and indigency. When he decided to get married and applied for a marriage license, his application was denied. The county clerk, Thomas Zablocki, denied the application because Wisconsin law provided that persons obligated to pay child support were required to receive permission to marry from a judge. The statute was designed to insure that persons under support orders would meet their existing obligations before becoming parents of additional children within the contemplated marriage. Redhail had not received the required judicial approval.

Redhail filed suit in federal district court, and that court agreed that his rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Wisconsin had unreasonably interfered with a fundamental right-the right to marry.

Burns v. Burns

Three years after Susan and Darian Burns divorced, a dispute arose regarding Susan's visitation rights with their three children. The parties resolved the dispute by signing a consent decree which provided "there shall be no visitation nor residence with either party during any time where such party cohabits with or has over night stays with any adult to which such party is not legally married..." Subsequent to the entry of the consent decree, Susan Burns and another woman entered into a civil union in accordance with the laws of the State of Vermont. After learning of Susan's action, Darian brought a contempt motion against her for having conducted visitation with their minor children while she was living with her civil union partner. Susan appealed the trial court's ruling that the consent order was fully enforceable. The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed and ruled that Susan and her partner were not married under the laws of Vermont and in any event, Georgia law explicitly provided that same-sex couples could not be recognized as married in Georgia.

Adoption of Tammy

Susan and Helen, cohabiting lesbians, petitioned a family court judge to jointly adopt Susan's biological daughter, Tammy. The trial judge granted the petition after a hearing and sought appellate confirmation of this decision. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the highest state court) affirmed, concluding that there was no statutory basic for preventing this joint adoption, which was shown to be in the best interests of the child. The women were both surgeons and faculty members at Harvard Medical School, had been partners in a long-term relationship for over ten years, and had jointly and separately cared for the child.

Lehr v. Robertson

Jonathan Lehr is the alleged father of Jessica, a child born to Lorraine Robertson out of wedlock in New York State. After Jessica was born, Robertson married Richard Robertson. When Jessica was two, Richard successfully petitioned to adopt Jessica. After learning of the adoption, Lehr sought to vacate the adoption order on the grounds that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law had been violated.

The Supreme Court ruled that Lehr was not denied any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He had neither protected his rights as a putative father under New York law, nor had he maintained a substantial relationship with Jessica.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance statute. The statute required students to attend school until the age of 16. These parents, who were Amish, refused to send their children to school after completion of the eighth grade, because it was contrary to their religious beliefs. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent parents, who claimed that the school attendance statute violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court recognized that states have the right to establish reasonable regulations relating to education. Under the facts of this case, however, the state's interests had to be subordinated to those of the parents in exercising their religious beliefs. Although this is a case focusing on religious liberty, it also illustrates judicial support for the traditional right of parents to determine their children's religious upbringing.

State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer

During 1987, 16-year-old Colleen provided day care for 12-year-old Shane. The two began a sexual relationship that resulted in Colleen giving birth to a child in 1989, when the mother and father were 17 and 13 years old, respectively. Although Shane was a victim of child abuse himself, a Kansas district court judge ordered him to pay $50 in child support per month and found him responsible for over $7,000 in other assistance provided to the mother and baby in conjunction with the childbirth. Shane filed an appeal arguing that since he could not legally consent to sexual relations with Colleen, he should not be obligated to pay child support. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The court ruled that the criminal-law meaning of consent should not be used to construe the child support law, and that identified policy considerations weighed in favor of imposing liability on minors like Shane who become fathers.

Nash v. Mulle

Charles Mulle, a noncustodial parent, was ordered to pay $200 in monthly child support and other expenses for his 3-year-old daughter Melissa in 1984. Melissa was conceived in an extramarital affair with Helen Nash. Mulle had no contact with either Melissa or Nash after the affair. In 1990, Nash, the custodial parent, filed an action to increase child support, having learned that Mulle's yearly income had increased from $30,000 to $292,000 between 1984 and 1989. Nash earned roughly $42,000 in 1989.

The trial court, after a hearing, substantially increased Mulle's child support obligation and ordered him to contribute to an educational trust fund for Melissa. The state appeals court modified the support order and disallowed the educational trust, and Nash appealed to the state supreme court. The state supreme court reversed the appeals court. It ruled that children born of a wealthy parent should benefit from that circumstance. It also concluded that in factual circumstances such as those in this case, the trial court acted lawfully in ordering the funding of the trust to accumulate money for Melissa's college education.

In re Marriage of Riddle

Dorothy Riddle filed a petition in 1990 to end her four-year marriage to her husband, Michael. At that time the trial court awarded temporary physical custody of their child, Lauren, to Dorothy. When the dissolution decree was finally issued in 1992, the trial court decided that it would be in the child's best interest for Michael to be the custodial parent, and that Dorothy should pay child support. Dorothy appealed, contending that she was being punished for being the primary family breadwinner. The state supreme court found that Michael had been the child's primary caregiver and had been an exemplary parent. The child had clearly bonded with him more closely than with Dorothy. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

O'Brien v. O'Briene

Plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife were married in 1971. At the time, they were both private-school teachers. The wife did not pursue her permanent certification in order to allow her husband to finish college and attend medical school. During medical school, the wife contributed all her earnings to their joint expenses. Two months after receiving his medical license, the husband filed for divorce. The issue before the court was whether the husband's medical license constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution under New York law. After conflicting holdings in the lower courts, the New York Court of Appeals conclusively determined that the license did constitute marital property and could, therefore, be distributed at the dissolution of the marriage.