Macomber v. Dillman

The Macombers sued their doctor and a hospital association for negligence relating to a failed tubal ligation performed on Roxanne Macomber, who gave birth to a healthy, normal child following her sterilization procedure. The plaintiffs sought damages for, among other items, the costs of raising and educating the child. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiffs' complaint did not state an actionable claim. The court denied the motion and ruled that if the plaintiffs prevailed, they could recover standard damages, including child-rearing expenses.

The case was reported to the Supreme Court of Maine on a joint motion of the parties. The court held that plaintiffs did set forth a claim for negligence, but that child-rearing costs for a healthy child were not recoverable, as a matter of public policy.

Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. J.C. Johnson and Kerry Lynn Johnson

A train hit J.C. Johnson's truck while he was driving across the tracks at an unprotected railroad crossing. To reach the crossing, Johnson had driven up a very steep grade and once he reached the top his vision up and down the tracks was greatly limited by vegetation. Johnson, who survived the collision, "suffered brain injury, a cracked pelvis, bruised lungs, and pneumonia." He and his wife sued the railway for negligence and the case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The railroad appealed. One of the grounds for appeal was the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on hedonic damages. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the record and affirmed the trial court's hedonic damages instruction.

Volz v. Coleman Company, Inc.

The plaintiff in this case was severely burned, at the age of five, by a stream of fuel ejected by a Coleman camp stove. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently designed the fuel tank filler cap. The case was tried by a jury, and the plaintiff was awarded $6.8 million in compensatory damages and $1.06 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed the awards. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which limited its review to the issue of punitive damages. The court reversed the $1.06 million award, holding that the plaintiff had not met the standard of proving that Coleman's actions were motivated by an "evil mind."

Lakewood Creative Costumers v. Sharp

The plaintiff rented a Halloween costume to the defendant, Sharp, for $20. The rental agreement included a liquidated damages clause stating that "an amount equal to one-half the rental fee will be charged for each day the costume is returned late." Sharp returned the costume 79 days late, and the plaintiff sued in small claims court. At a hearing before a referee, the plaintiff testified that he had lost one rental during the 79 days. The referee awarded the plaintiff $500, noting that the plaintiff's complaint sought only that amount. Sharp filed objections to the referee's report, and the matter was brought to the trial court. It entered judgment against Sharp for $400.

The Ohio appellate court held that the liquidated damages clause was invalid because it provided for a disproportionate recovery to the plaintiff and because the actual damages incurred by the defendant's breach of contract were ascertainable. The court affirmed the trial judge's judgment against Sharp, but reduced the amount to $20, for the loss of one rental, and court costs.

ano v. School District No. 411 of Twin Falls County, Idaho

The plaintiff, a high school student, wore a T-shirt to school that showed a caricature of three high school administrators holding alcoholic beverages and acting drunk. The school district refused to allow him to wear the shirt in school. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction in U.S. District Court enjoining the school district from suspending him for wearing the shirt in school. The district court followed the Ninth Circuit's test for determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction and declined to grant the motion. The court ruled that the harm to the student was minimal and that he had only a "minuscule" chance of success on the case's merits, while the administrators were exercising their statutory duty of teaching students about the effects of alcohol.

Department of Transportation v. Ronlee, Inc.

Ronlee, Inc., the plaintiff, was the successful bidder on a large construction contract with the Florida Department of Transportation. Five days after signing the contract, the plaintiff notified the defendant that the bid contained a unilateral error of $317,463, still bringing it under the next lowest bid. In response, the defendant informed Ronlee that although it was aware of the error, public policy prevented modification to the contract price.

After working on the project for twenty-one months, Ronlee brought an action seeking reformation of the contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court held in favor of Ronlee, stating that the department's failure to take action regarding the error constituted inequitable conduct. The Florida District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that reformation is an inappropriate remedy for unilateral mistakes in public contract bids unless inequitable conduct has occurred. The court concluded that the department's silence regarding the mistake was immaterial when Ronlee opted not to withdraw its bid after discovering the miscalculation. The trial judge's order was reversed and the case remanded with an order to enter judgment for the transportation department.

Campbell Soup Company v. Wentzep

George and Harry Wentz, Pennsylvania farmers, contracted to deliver a particular type of carrot to Campbell Soup. At a later date, when the carrots had become scarce, causing the market price to skyrocket, the defendants informed Campbell Soup that they would not sell the carrots at the agreed upon contract price. Campbell Soup brought suit to enjoin the defendants from selling the carrots elsewhere and to compel specific performance of the contract.

The U.S. District Court denied the plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Campbell appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that although specific performance would ordinarily have been an appropriate remedy, in this instance, the contract contained "unconscionable bargains" that equity cannot enforce.

Isbell v. Brighton Area Schools

Plaintiff Isbell was denied her high school diploma at Brighton High School due to the fact that she violated the school's unexcused absence policy. Isbell brought a suit in equity, and the trial court allowed her motion for summary disposition and ordered Brighton to award her a diploma. Brighton appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Appeals Court reversed the decision of the lower court holding that Isbell was precluded from seeking equitable relief due to the maxim of "unclean hands." The court reasoned that because Isbell came before the court with unclean hands (i.e. Isbell admitted to the forgery of excuse notes), an equitable remedy is inappropriate. Isbell is left to pursue her usual remedies at law.

Bloch v. Hillel Torah North Suburban Day School

Bloch, an elementary school child, was expelled from the school for excessive tardiness and absences. Her parents sought to enjoin expulsion and requested specific performance to educate their daughter. The trial court denied injunctive relief and both sides filed for summary judgment. The court ruled in favor of the defendant but granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint seeking money damages. The appellate court of Illinois affirmed the decision to deny specific performance, concluding that the remedy for breach of a personal services contract is an action for money damages. Consequently, the court remanded the matter to allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.

Iacomini v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

Iacomini, the plaintiff, contracted with Zadlo to tow, store, and repair a Mercedes- Benz automobile. Zadlo had represented himself as the owner of the car. The car, however, had been stolen, and Liberty Mutual had obtained title to the vehicle by paying the true owner's insurance claim. Upon locating the car, Liberty Mutual sought to take possession, but Iacomini refused until his storage and repair fees were paid. Liberty Mutual brought a replevin action against Iacomini. The court granted the motion but ordered Liberty Mutual to retain possession and ownership of the car for ninety days to allow Iacomini time to initiate an action against the company for reimbursement.

The plaintiff then filed for an ex parte attachment, claiming $10,000 in storage fees. Shortly thereafter, Iacomini also moved to amend his complaint to add a claim for unjust enrichment. The court found for Liberty Mutual, reasoning that the plaintiff did not have either a statutory or common law lien, for he had not contracted with the true owner's knowledge, consent, or acquiescence.

On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's decision regarding the statutory or common law lien, but held that plaintiff may be entitled to restitution under principles of equity. According to the state supreme court, an equitable lien could be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment to the extent of improvements made to the property. The lower court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint was reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.

State v. Yelsen Land Company

This case was an action by the state to settle a dispute concerning title to certain tidelands, submerged lands, and particular waters in South Carolina. The state sought to enjoin the defendants from trespassing on the property and to confirm title to the land. The defendants, by way of an answer, also claimed title and sought injunctive relief. The judge, over the state's objection and on its own motion, referred all issues for trial to a master in equity. The state appealed. The court reversed, holding that since the complaint incorporated both equitable and legal issues, the legal issues must be tried by a jury, while the equitable issues would be determined by the judge.