United States v. Lopez

Lopez was a 12th grade student who arrived at high school with a concealed handgun. He was arrested and charged with a violation of the "Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990" which made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a firearm at a place that a person knows or has reason to know is a school zone. Lopez sought to have the action dismissed, arguing that the Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to control state public schools. The motion was denied, and Lopez was found guilty. The Court of Appeals agreed with Lopez and reversed his conviction. On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Court.

The Act was invalid as it went beyond Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. The Act did not: regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce; regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and it did not regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. The Act's regulated activity, handgun possession in a school zone, did not comply with any of the three prongs used to analyze laws under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

State v. Butler

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, and he appealed, claiming that during the trial, prosecutors used some of his prior inconsistent statements made to the police without Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination does not operate to exclude the prosecution's use of voluntary statements of an accused, made to police without Miranda warnings, if those statements are used for the sole purpose of impeaching credibility on cross-examination.

Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc.

This is a case in which a tavern sold liquor to a patron who was subsequently involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision on May 5, 1982. Blood alcohol analysis indicated the patron was legally intoxicated at the time of the collision. The plaintiff, Leland Adkins, was left a quadriplegic as a result of this incident. On June 28, 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court, without warning, changed the law to make a vendor of liquor liable for negligence in serving patrons. Adkins filed suit against the tavern in U.S. District Court. The district court requested that the Wyoming Supreme Court clarify whether the new precedent should apply prospectively or also retroactively. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the new precedent should only apply prospectively.

Strunk v. Strunk

The mother of an incompetent 27-year-old man petitioned the court for authority to allow a kidney from her son to be transplanted into her 28-year-old son, who was suffering from a fatal kidney disease. The state circuit court adopted the findings of the county court, which held that the operation was necessary and that the incompetent's well-being would be more severely jeopardized by the death of his brother than by surgery.

On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that a court of equity had the power to authorize the surgery when the findings of the lower court were based on substantial evidence.

Hubbard Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Greeson

Greeson, an Indiana resident, filed a wrongful death action, as the administrator of her husband's estate, against the defendant, an Indiana corporation that manufactured lifts used to clean streetlights. The plaintiff's husband, who was also an Indiana resident, died while using one of the defendant's lifts in Illinois. The defendant moved the trial court for a ruling on whether the product liability laws of Indiana or Illinois were applicable. The court determined that Indiana substantive law applied. The state court of appeals concluded otherwise and held that under Indiana conflict-of-law rules, Illinois law must be used.

The plaintiff appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. That court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply Indiana substantive law. In so holding, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the significant relationship approach governed, rather than the rigid lex loci delicti commissi, since all parties resided in Indiana and the situs of the tort bore "little connection" to the action.

Baker et al. v. General Motors

Elwell and General Motors (GM) entered into a settlement agreement, the details of which permanently enjoined Elwell from "testifying [in any other matters concerning GM] without the consent of GM." This settlement agreement concluded a Michigan State action. Baker filed an independent lawsuit against GM in Missouri, and Elwell was subpoenaed to testify. The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the full-faith-and-credit clause prohibited Elwell from testifying in the Missouri action without GM's consent. The U.S. Supreme Court decided to review the case. While the full-faith-and-credit clause does compel Missouri to comply with a Michigan judgment that is properly ordered, Michigan does not have the power to dictate what a sister state must do with an evidentiary matter (who will testify) in an entirely separate proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.