Olsen and Brown v. City of Englewood

Olsen and Brown, a law partnership, entered into a contract with the City of Englewood to perform legal services. The terms of the agreement provided for a monthly fee to be paid by the city to the lawyers. Subsequently, Englewood terminated the relationship without cause, and Olsen filed a breach of contract action seeking payment for fees anticipated by the terms of the contract but not yet earned by the lawyers. The trial court dismissed the part of the action that sought legal fees for services that had not been rendered. The court of appeals affirmed the decision, and Olsen appealed to the State Supreme Court.

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court holding that the relationship between a client and an attorney is not subject to classical contract analysis. An attorney-client relationship is a special relationship, and to promote the desirable relationship, a client must be free to terminate it at any time. The court concluded that an attorney's recovery in such situations is limited to the value of services rendered as of the date of the relationship's termination. This quantum meruit recovery protects the special nature of the attorney-client relationship and assures fair compensation to the attorney.

Dorsey v. Gregg

This case involves a defendant who appealed a trial court's entry of default judgment against him. The plaintiff attempted to have the defendant served, in hand, at his fraternity house. When personal service was unsuccessful, the trial court authorized alternative service on any resident member of the fraternity house and by certified mail to the home of the defendant's father. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that alternative service should not have been allowed since no attempt was made to locate the defendant at his dwelling. The trial court, therefore, lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Debra Clark v. Fredrick J. Klein

This is a medical malpractice case brought by the Corey Ayre's parents against the emergency room doctor who treated Corey prior to his death from peritonitis. The case was tried to a jury, which found in favor of the doctor. The parents appealed because the trial court had allowed an expert whose testimony had not been previously disclosed to the parents during discovery. The doctor had been requested in an interrogatory to disclose the name of all expert witnesses and the nature and content of their intended testimony, but at that time had not chosen any experts. At no time prior to trial did the defendant inform the plaintiffs of the substance of the expert's testimony regarding the condition of Corey's intestine at the time of his discharge from the hospital.

This failure to disclose prevented the plaintiffs from investigating the expert's theory, consulting with other experts, and preparing the expert's cross examination. The appeals court concluded that this omission was a serious violation of the rules of civil procedure, reversed the trial judge and remanded the case for a new trial.

Terry L. LaGuesse v. Storytown U.S.A. Inc.

Plaintiff LaGuesse injured her head, back and shoulder while visiting an amusement park. During the course of the trial, the defendant objected to testimony that it believed was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court ruled that the testimony of both witnesses were spontaneous declarations and admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. After a jury trial and plaintiff's verdict, the amusement park appealed after its motion to set aside the verdict was denied and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.

The defendants then appealed. The appellate court ruled that the questioned testimony did not qualify as spontaneous declarations and that they were "improperly admitted" by the trial court. Although the defendants prevailed on the hearsay issue, they did not convince the court to reverse the trial judgment. The appellate court found that even after excluding the inadmissible hearsay evidence, the jury's verdict was supported by "ample admissible and credible evidence" and affirmed the judgment.

Raymond Binkley v. Georgette Allen

This is a physician-patient privilege case in which discovery disputes led to Binkley's filing a motion to compel discovery. Allen appealed the trial court's ruling that Allen disclose whether she had taken prescribed medication at the time of the vehicle collision as well as privileged information regarding her prior medical treatment history to Binkley. The appellate court concluded that the physician-patient privilege did apply to the compelled disclosure of her prescription medication history and this information did not have to be provided to Binkley. It ruled, however, that the privilege did not apply to disclosure of the names of any drug and alcohol centers utilized by Allen, and that this information was subject to discovery.

Cody v. Atkins

Cody brought suit for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile collision between her car and defendant Atkins' pickup truck. The case was tried by a six- person jury. At the close of the defendant's case, the plaintiff-appellant moved for a directed verdict, which was denied by the court. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Atkins, and the court entered judgment accordingly. After trial, Cody motioned the court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) and for a new trial. The trial court denied both motions, and Cody appealed to the state supreme court. That court ruled that the defendant's evidence had been sufficient to raise a jury question regarding negligence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cody's posttrial motions.

Armon v. Griggs

Michael Armon operated a bar in premises leased from Carl and Vera Griggs. He filed suit against the Griggs' for wrongful eviction and conversion. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict on both claims in the total amount of $52,290 for the wrongful eviction, and $92,365 for the conversion. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdicts and posttrial motions filed by the Griggs' for a new trial and remittitur were denied. The Griggs' contended on appeal that the verdict for conversion was grossly excessive and that remittitur or a new trial should have been ordered by the trial court in motions after verdict. The appellate court agreed with the appellants. The court ordered that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial unless Armon agreed to a remittitur of $55,000 of the $92,356 in damages awarded by the jury for conversion