Gregg v. Georgia

Gregg was an individual tried and convicted of murder in the State of Georgia. In accordance with the state law, Gregg was sentenced to death. He appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the court granted his request for review. Gregg argued that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment and thus was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The justices disagreed with Gregg and affirmed his death sentence. The Court reasoned that capital punishment was an acceptable form of punishment in the United States since its inception and does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The justices reasoned that capital punishment serves two of the purposes of our penal system-retribution and deterrence. The Court found strength in its views from a review of the individual states, the majority of which had some type of capital punishment at the time. The Court concluded that the morality of capital punishment was clear as evidenced by the voice of the people and the long history of acceptance of such sentences in the United States.

State v. Mobbley

Mobbley was married to Ricky Mobbley. Ricky and another man, Andrew Needham, were hiding in the Mobbley residence when the police arrived with felony arrest warrants for the two of them. Upon being questioned by the police as to the whereabouts of the two men, Mrs. Mobbley denied that they were in the house although she knew they were present. If Mobbley disclosed the presence of Needham, she would have been disclosing the presence of her husband as well. Mobbley was charged with violating a New Mexico statute that criminalized "harboring or aiding" a felon. The statute exempted family members from this statute; it was not a crime to harbor one's husband. The trial court dismissed the criminal action against the wife, and the state appealed. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision holding that Mobbley could be prosecuted for harboring Needham since there was no family relationship between them.

The wife argued that because she could not have disclosed Needham without disclosing her husband, the statutory exception protected her from prosecution. The Court did not agree. While acknowledging that she was in a dilemma, the Court reversed the order of dismissal and sent the case back for trial.

Holland v. State of Florida

Holland was charged with misprison of felony. The law made it a crime to conceal the commission of a felony committed by another and failing to report the crime to the appropriate authorities. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case to decide whether the statute, misprison of felony, is a crime. The court concluded that misprison of felony is not a crime in Florida. Reasoning that, while it may be desirable to encourage citizens to get involved in reporting criminal activity, the court refused to criminalize otherwise innocent bystanders for failing to report a crime. Ruling that Florida citizens cherish the right to mind their own business, the misprison of felony statute was struck down.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Bonadio

Bonadio and another were arrested at an adult pornographic theater and charged with a violation of the Pennsylvania Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute. The trial court dismissed the case ruling that the statute was unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The state supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower court ruling that the Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute was an invalid exercise of the state's police power. The statute was an improper attempt by the state to regulate morality. Each individual should be free from interference in defining and pursuing his/her own morality. The state cannot enforce a majority morality on persons when their conduct does not harm others.

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wasson

Wasson was charged with violating Kentucky's law proscribing sodomy. The Kentucky Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional, stating that the law was an attempt by the state to regulate morality. In two dissenting opinions, justices concluded that Kentucky's legislature does have the right and the duty to regulate conduct such as sodomy. Citing to legislative history, the dissent noted that the act of sodomy has been criminalized for hundreds of years. If laws are subjected to the "harm to others test" advanced by the majority decision, many crimes such as drug use and suicide would be invalid. The dissent concludes in stating that morality of the citizenry, as evidenced by the statutes of their elected representatives in the legislature, is a sufficient rationale for the enactment of laws such as the sodomy law. If the law is to be changed, it is the legislature's job, not the courts.

Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Company

Darlington was a South Carolina Corporation operating a single textile mill. The majority owner of Darlington was Deering Milliken, which operated twenty-seven (27) different mills. Textile Workers, a labor union, initiated an organizational campaign at the Darlington mill and, after a vote of the employees, the Darlington workers became members of the Textile Workers Union. In response to the unionization of the mill, Darlington closed the plant and permanently terminated all operations. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found Darlington guilty of an unfair labor practice by closing the mill. The U.S. Court of Appeals set aside the finding of the NLRB, and the union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that there is nothing improper in an employer choosing to permanently cease operations. Even if done in response to the unionization of its employees, Darlington has the absolute right to close its plant if it chooses to do so. Just as employees have the right to quit their jobs, employers have the right to close their businesses. The Court, however, found that the fact that Darlington is part of Deering Milliken, which owns and operates 27 mills, must be taken into consideration. If the closing of the Darlington mill was done to prevent the employees of the other mills from unionizing, then the closing of the Darlington mill was an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded (sent back) the case for further proceedings to determine the cause and effect of the Darlington mill's closing on the other mills' employees.

State of New Jersey in the Interest of S.G.

S.G. was a juvenile defendant in a murder case that was subsequently transferred to adult court. The prosecution sought to disqualify S.G.'s privately retained private counsel. The government claimed that a conflict of interest would exist because S.G.'s chosen attorney had previously defended the person S.G. was accused of killing in one criminal case in two other murder cases that were pending at the time of the victim's murder. The trial court denied the state's motion after S.G. and his parents waived any conflict of representation objections in open court. The state appealed the trial court's ruling to the appellate division. The appellate court considered and rejected the state's various conflict theories. The possible appearance of impropriety was not a sufficient basis for disqualification under circumstances where there were no apparent violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A client has a presumptive right under the Sixth Amendment, said the court, to the attorney of his or her choice, subject to ethical limitations. The trial court's decision was affirmed.

DCH Health Services Company v. Waite

During a period of time when Randy Kramer and Los Angeles County Judge Ana Luna were engaged to be married, Judge Luna served on the board of directors of the Downey Community Hospital Foundation. Also at this time the hospital foundation and two other plaintiffs filed suit against Verner Waite, alleging defamation. Judge Luna did not serve in the jurisdiction in which the defamation cases would be tried. Two years later she resigned from the foundation board and she and Kramer were married. When Waite's initial counsel became ill, Kramer was retained to represent Waite. The trial court in the defamation cases ruled that because Luna had received confidential information while a member of the foundation's board before her marriage to Kramer, it would create an appearance of impropriety were he to defend Waite. The state court of appeals disagreed.

The appellate court found that there was no evidence that Luna had disclosed any confidential information to Kramer. The court also ruled that lawyers should be presumed to be acting ethically and the trial court should not have adopted a per se rule and disqualified an attorney solely based on an "appearance of impropriety theory" premised upon the existence of a marital relationship between two lawyers.