E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher

DuPont, the plaintiff, filed suit against the Christopher brothers, the defendants, alleging that they had revealed DuPont's trade secrets by obtaining aerial photographs of DuPont's methanol processing plant while the plant was still under construction. DuPont sought damages and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The U.S. District Court denied the defendants' motions for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state an actionable claim. The defendants took an interlocutory appeal (an appeal taken some time between the commencement and the end of a suit that decides a particular issue but is not a final decision on the entire controversy) to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that aerial photography of the partially exposed plant constituted an "improper means" of discovering trade secrets. By so holding, the court affirmed the lower court's decision that there was an actionable claim and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings on the merits.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health

Cruzan lost consciousness and fell into an irreversible vegetative state as a result of an automobile accident. After six years, her parents petitioned the Missouri trial court to order the withdrawal of her artificial nutrition and hydration tubes. The petition was granted. The state appealed, and the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that an incompetent person's desire to have medical treatment withdrawn or terminated must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence."

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (agreed to hear the matter) and balanced the liberty interest of an incompetent person under the due process clause of the Constitution against the interest of the state. The Court concluded that the heightened standard of "clear and convincing" evidence comports with the Constitution and that the substituted judgment of a family member or close friend would not meet the standard. Three justices dissented, arguing that an individual has a fundamental right to be free of unwanted medical intervention, and that right cannot be outweighed by a state's general interest in preserving life. According to the dissent, if a person is incapable of rendering a decision, the right to decide must be transferred to the family or a likely proxy of the patient.

Washington et al., Petitioners, v. Harold Glucksberg et al.

Glucksberg, a physician, frequently treated mentally competent but terminally ill patients who wished to hasten their deaths with medication. Glucksberg and three others brought suit in the state of Washington seeking to have a statute, which prohibited "causing or aiding another to attempt suicide," declared unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the doctors and found the assisted suicide ban unconstitutional based in large part on the conclusion that the Constitution's Due Process Clause contains a right to die. Upon appeal by the state of Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that due process does not afford someone the "right to die." Distinguishing between refusing unnatural life-sustaining medical assistance and hastening one's death with the aid of a physician, the Court ruled the statute constitutional.

City of Chicago v. Jesus Morales et al.

In 1992 the city council for Chicago enacted a city ordinance that made it a criminal offense for "criminal gang members to loiter with one another or with other persons in any public place." Jesus Morales was one of the many individuals charged with violating the ordinance, and he sought review of its constitutionality. The Illinois Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed (upheld) the state court decision. The ordinance was declared unconstitutionally vague due to the fact that it allowed arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. The Due Process Clause requires that laws be written so as to set specific limits on the discretion of law enforcement officers. While acknowledging the real problem that street gangs cause the citizens of Chicago, the Court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Bani

Eto Bani was convicted of a misdemeanor sex offense for having twice grabbed a young woman's buttocks. As a convicted sex offender, he was ordered to register with the state attorney general. Bani appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court. That court concluded that the state's constitution required that Eto be given notice and an individualized hearing (where he could argue that he posed no threat to society) before his personal information was released to the general public. The court's rationale was that public notification without an individualized hearing would infringe on Eto's basic procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing under the Hawaii Constitution.

Katko v. Briney

Katko, the plaintiff, trespassed in an uninhabited house owned by the defendants, the Brineys. While doing so, Katko triggered a loaded spring gun set up by defendants in the bedroom to protect their property. The state trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded him both actual and punitive damages. The defendants appealed the actual damages portion of the verdict. The Iowa Supreme Court held that reasonable force may be used to protect property, but not such force that inflicts great bodily injury or causes death, even where the injured or deceased party violated the law by trespassing. The court found that use of a spring gun would be justified only when a trespasser was committing a felony of violence or one punishable by death, or endangering human life.

Suggs v. Norris

Suggs sued the estate of Norris for compensation relating to her services rendered in the operation of Norris's produce business. Suggs and Norris cohabited while unmarried and were also business partners. A jury found for Suggs, and the trial judge denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.). The defendant appealed, arguing on public policy grounds that because Suggs and Norris were illegally cohabiting, Suggs was not entitled to compensation under a quantum meruit theory, nor was the agreement Suggs alleged existed enforceable. The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision, holding that agreements regarding finances and property of unmarried but cohabiting couples are enforceable because sexual services or promises for sexual services do not constitute consideration for the agreements. There were sufficient facts before the jury, concluded the court, to permit it to find that Suggs and Norris had a mutual understanding regarding Suggs's compensation.