 |
| | | | | American Constitutional Law, Volume One
Gregg Ivers, American University
| | |
| | | | Case Problems
Chapter Two: Interpreting the Constitution
Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided?
In 1857, the Supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott v. Sanford that slaves did not become free persons by traveling into a federal territory or state where slavery was illegal. Dred Scott argued that he had become a free person after his owner, an army medical officer named John Emerson, had taken him into Illinois and other military posts located north of the 36*30' line (roughly north and east of Missouri) where slavery had been outlawed. Under the Missouri Compromise of 1820, Congress agreed to admit Missouri as a slave state, Maine as a free state and banned slavery north of the 36*30' line. To win his freedom, Scott sought a federal court ruling on his claim that his presence on free soil changed his status as a slave. But in order for Scott to bring a lawsuit in federal court, he would need to demonstrate that he was a United States citizen.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney, a former slaveholder from Maryland, ruled that Scott was not a citizen and thus was not entitled to a bring a lawsuit in federal court contesting his status as a slave. Moreover, Taney declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional because Congress had no power to interfere with the rights of individuals to hold and own property as set out in the Constitution. But the most inflammatory section of Taney's opinion dealt with his conclusion that the Constitution did not confer any rights upon African Americans. Taney reviewed the history of "negroes" in the United States, noting that they had been imported as slaves with no intention of becoming part of "the people" for whom the Declaration of Independence was written. They had always been regarded as "beings of an inferior order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights the white man was bound to respect;" and that the "negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit." Justice Taney went on to say that "negroes" could be carried anywhere and required to serve in any capacity. This was the opinion and regard in which the white, civilized world held the negro, one that was enshrined in the Declaration and ultimately the Constitution. These were not persons, wrote Taney, but property, to be bought, sold and used as their owners wanted. (view an excerpt of the opinion)
Taney's opinion was highly controversial, and many scholars have strongly argued that Dred Scott was the first shot fired in the Civil War. Taney went far beyond the immediate question presented in the case: whether or not Dred Scott was a citizen entitled to bring suit in federal court. He offered a long historical commentary on the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, concluding that, despite its universal language, it was never intended to embrace the "enslaved African race." Taney also concluded that the "state of public opinion" had "undergone no change" when the Constitution was adopted. He pointed to the two clauses in the Constitution that dealt explicitly with slavery: the Fugitive Slave Clause, which required the return of escaped slaves to their master, and the provision that permitted the importation of slaves until 1808. The limits on importation, Taney noted, did not speak to the issue of slave traffic and ownership. In sum, Taney maintained that the Constitution was not "neutral" on the subject of slavery, but decidedly protective of the institution. Congress had no right to establish limits on slavery in the territories, and could not determined how slave owners could use their property.
Contemporary scholars (and two dissenting justices in Dred Scott) have criticized Taney's opinion as a prime exercise in judicial activism, introducing the Court into a political dispute that was the responsibility of Congress and the state legislatures to resolve. It was also unnecessary for Taney to go beyond the issue of Scott's citizenship. Taney used Dred Scott to place a decidedly pro-Southern and racist imprint on the Constitution. Taney's motives in using the Supreme Court's authority were clear, as Dred Scott marked the first time since Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the Court had declared a federal law unconstitutional.
But did Taney have a valid historical argument? Did the Constitution's language recognizing and protecting slavery and the slave trade, plus the 3/5th's Compromise that diluted the census count for states with a slave population, exclude African Americans from citizenship and the protections that went with it? Is Taney's understanding of black rights under the Constitution a valid exercise in the application of original intent in constitutional interpretation? Or is Taney's opinion in Dred Scott wrong based on any theory of constitutional interpretation?
| | | |
| |
|
