1526-1791
The capture of Belgrade in 1521 allowed Ottoman forces to advance into Hungary, most of which they overran in 1526, following the battles of
Mohács. The Hapsburg rulers of Austria and Bohemia now became directly involved in holding back the Turks. However, with both sides distracted by internal and external concerns, neither was able to engage its full military resources for prolonged periods, and hostilities therefore consisted primarily of border raids. When major forces became engaged, Austria possessed the advantage, for by the 1530s Hapsburg infantry had already learned to combine shock and fire, a tactical combination to which the Turks never found an answer.
In 1529 the Turks appeared before the gates of
Vienna. Forced to withdraw, they advanced again in 1532, but major imperial forces drove them back. Both sides now began to fortify all strategic locations along the frontier, creating a defense in depth that prevented substantial gains by either side. An armistice, permitting frontier raiding, was concluded in 1547; although fighting intensified again between 1555 and 1562, stalemate returned until the indecisive "Long War" of 1593-1606.
The revival of Turkish power brought a renewed confrontation in 1663-1664 and another major Turkish offensive culminating in the siege of
Vienna in 1683. But Vienna held, and the Turks were badly defeated by a European coalition, including Catholic and Protestant forces, and expelled from Hungary in 1699. Eager to gain further territory, Austria went to war from 1716 to 1718 and allied itself with Russia against the Turks in 1737, but suffered a major defeat. In 1788 Austria once again joined Russia against the Turks, but following setbacks and facing threats in the West, made peace in 1791.
After 1600, the Turks seemed unable to innovate, only to imitate: most new techniques (such as use of pistols, musketry volleys, and bastion fortifications) were introduced by, and remained largely confined to, European defectors. However, the enormous size and the combat effectiveness of Turkish armies sufficed to keep the West at bay until the nineteenth century, when industrial production provided Christian forces with a decisive advantage.
Gunther E. Rothenberg
