Early in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Shenandoah Valley: July-August 1864 :
      Monocacy, Maryland (MD007) , Frederick County, July 9, 1864

Gary W. Gallagher

CS Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early and the 14,000 soldiers of his Army of the Valley (Early's name for the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia plus other attached units) were on the move in the second week of July 1864. Early had received orders from CS General Robert E. Lee to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, menace Washington and Baltimore, and compel US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant to counter his movements, thereby weakening the Army of the Potomac. Early drove Union troops from the Valley and then crossed the Potomac, swinging north and east from Shepherdstown to approach Washington from the rear.

On the morning of July 9 General Early's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, Maryland, with CS Major General Robert E. Rodes's Division in the lead on the National Road, moving east to threaten Union forces guarding the direct route to Baltimore. CS Major General Stephen Ramseur's Division edged southward on the Georgetown Pike connecting Frederick with Washington. The divisions of CS Major General John B. Gordon and CS Brigadier General Gabriel C. Wharton, under the command of CS Major General John C. Breckinridge, and the cavalry of CS Brigadier General John McCausland advanced down the Buckeystown Road. Two artillery battalions were with Ramseur and one with Breckinridge.

A force of about 5,800 soldiers under US Major General Lewis Wallace awaited the Confederates on the east bank of the Monocacy River just below Frederick. Uncertain whether Early's goal was Washington or Baltimore, Wallace had selected a position from which he could dispute Confederate crossings of the Monocacy on both the National Road to Baltimore and the Georgetown Pike. Northern estimates placed Early's force at between 20,000 and 30,000 men—far too many for Wallace to defeat in a stand-up fight. The Union commander did hope to determine Early's destination, secure an accurate count of Confederate numbers, and detain the army long enough for Grant to "get a corps or two into Washington and make it safe." Wallace's command included home guards and other second-line troops consolidated as a brigade under US Brigadier General Erastus B. Tyler, as well as US Brigadier General James B. Ricketts's veteran VI Corps division from the Army of the Potomac. Sent away from the Petersburg lines in response to Early's campaign in Maryland, Ricketts's two brigades had joined Wallace at about 1:00 a.m. on July 9.

Wallace expected the Confederates to attack in the vicinity of Monocacy Junction—where the Georgetown Pike and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad cross the river—or to seize fords farther downstream. Watching both of these critical points on the line were Ricketts's brigades, positioned on high ground running southwest from a covered wooden bridge that carried the Georgetown Pike across the river. Tyler's brigade held the Union right, guarding fords and bridges from the Baltimore & Ohio's iron bridge upstream to the National Road. Union defenders at the junction made use of two blockhouses, one on each side of the Monocacy, and rifle pits on the east bank of the river. A line of Union skirmishers crouched behind the railroad embankment west of the river. Six 3-inch rifled guns and a 24-pounder howitzer, the latter in an emplacement overlooking the bridges near the junction, supported the Union infantry.

The morning of July 9 was bright and warm, with a cooling breeze sweeping over the lush countryside south of Frederick. Skirmishing erupted at about 6:30 a.m. between Ramseur's Division and Union soldiers positioned astride the Georgetown Pike west of the river. The Confederates pushed the Union pickets back and moved into position in the fields of the Best farm, west of the railroad and the pike. Soon three Confederate batteries were dueling with the Federal guns across the river. Convinced by the volume of Union fire that it would be costly to storm the covered bridge on the Georgetown Road, Ramseur asked Early if there were some other route across the Monocacy. To the north, meanwhile, Rodes's Division had engaged Tyler's troops in fitful fighting along the National Road.

The focus of the battle shifted to the southwest when McCausland's Confederate cavalry forced its way across the Monocacy a mile and a quarter below the junction at the Worthington-McKinney Ford. Ricketts reacted swiftly by moving across the Thomas farm toward the Worthington farm and placing some of his soldiers behind a fence that divided the two properties. Late in the morning McCausland's dismounted cavalrymen advanced through waist-high corn between the Worthington house and the river. Union infantry, partially hidden by the fence, easily stopped the surprised Confederate troopers. McCausland reformed his men and renewed the attack at about 2:00 p.m., this time striking the Union force farther to the right. After gaining ground in the direction of the Thomas farm, the Confederates fell back a second time in the face of superior Union firepower.

Both Wallace and Early realized the importance of McCausland's movements. Wallace sensed potential disaster on his left and decided to commit all of Ricketts's veterans on that end of the line. He ordered the covered bridge burned, thus releasing its defenders from their stations, and deployed all but one piece of artillery on Ricketts's front. As smoke billowed skyward from the blazing span shortly after noon, Early was at work on the west side of the Monocacy. Orders went to Breckinridge "to move rapidly with Gordon's and Wharton's divisions to McCausland's assistance ... and strike the enemy on his left flank, and drive him from the position commanding the crossings in Ramseur's front, so as to enable the latter to cross."

The climactic phase of the battle began at about 3:30 p.m. Ramseur and Rodes continued to apply pressure at Monocacy Junction and the National Road, while Gordon's three brigades prepared to assault the Union left from positions on the Worthington farm. The Confederate attacks began with CS Brigadier General Clement A. Evans's Brigade of Georgians, which moved over Brooks Hill to strike US Colonel William S. Truex's brigade of Ricketts's division. Bitter fighting in the wheatfield on the Thomas farm brought a bloody stalemate. Evans received a serious wound, and a Georgia private wrote later that "it made our hearts ache to look over the battle field and see so many of our dear friends, comrades and beloved officers, killed and wounded."

Gordon's two other brigades rapidly added their power to the Confederate attacks. CS Brigadier General Zebulon York's regiments engaged Truex just to Evans's left, followed closely by CS Brigadier General William Terry's men, who collided with US Colonel Matthew R. McClennan's brigade near the river. Union defenders fought valiantly in the fields and among the buildings of the Thomas farm, yielding slowly to pressure from Gordon's infantry and the enfilading fire from Confederate artillery across the Monocacy. A final Union line took advantage of fences and cuts in the Georgetown Pike on the north side of the Thomas farm. Sheltered by that natural breastwork, men from New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New Jersey sent a crippling fire into Confederates struggling up from a small creek bottom in their front. "In this ravine the fighting was desperate and at close quarters," Gordon recalled after the war. "Nearly one half of my men and large numbers of the Federals fell there."

It soon became clear that Union courage must give way to Confederate numbers. Wallace, fearing that prolonged resistance might bring the destruction of his small force, ordered a withdrawal to the National Road. At about 4:30 p.m. the Union army abandoned its position in front of Ramseur, enabling the Confederates to cross the railroad bridge. Gordon's exhausted troops watched as Ramseur's soldiers harried the retreating Union soldiers. Rodes subsequently joined Ramseur, but Early called off the pursuit and allowed Wallace to escape. Early's somewhat puzzling explanation after the war was that he did not wish to be encumbered by a large number of prisoners.

The battle of the Monocacy was a clear tactical victory for Jubal Early. At a cost of between 700 and 900 men killed and wounded, the Army of the Valley drove Wallace's troops from the field and inflicted heavy casualties. In Ricketts's division, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the northern side, 726 were killed and wounded and 568 listed as missing. Tyler's brigade lost 70 killed and wounded and 115 missing. Union losses totaled 1,294 of the 5,800 present for duty.

Despite suffering a clear tactical defeat, Wallace achieved his larger strategic goal. Early expended a precious twenty-four hours, which permitted reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to reach Washington ahead of the Confederates. Had Wallace failed to intercept Early south of Frederick, the Army of the Valley might have fought its way into Washington on July 10. The political implications of such a victory for the Confederacy are interesting to contemplate but impossible to gauge with any certainty. It can be said with confidence that Wallace's troops spared the Lincoln government a potential disaster, and for that reason the battle of the Monocacy must be considered one of the more significant actions of the Civil War.

Estimated Casualties: 1,294 US, 700-900 CS

Monocacy National Battlefield, three miles south of Frederick near Interstate 270 and Route 355, includes 1,647 acres of the historic battlefield; 331 of these acres are privately owned.